Self-reflection on privacy research in social networking sites by De Wolf, Ralf et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tbit20
Download by: [91.65.186.94] Date: 02 November 2016, At: 07:57
Behaviour & Information Technology
ISSN: 0144-929X (Print) 1362-3001 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tbit20
Self-reflection on privacy research in social
networking sites
Ralf De Wolf, Ellen Vanderhoven, Bettina Berendt, Jo Pierson & Tammy
Schellens
To cite this article: Ralf De Wolf, Ellen Vanderhoven, Bettina Berendt, Jo Pierson & Tammy
Schellens (2016): Self-reflection on privacy research in social networking sites, Behaviour &
Information Technology, DOI: 10.1080/0144929X.2016.1242653
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0144929X.2016.1242653
Published online: 17 Oct 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 65
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Self-reflection on privacy research in social networking sites
Ralf De Wolfa,b, Ellen Vanderhovenc, Bettina Berendtd, Jo Piersona and Tammy Schellensc
aDepartment of Media and Communication Studies (Iminds-SMIT-VUB), Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussel, Belgium; bDepartment of
Communication Sciences (Cepec, Iminds-MICT-Ugent), Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium; cDepartment of Educational Studies, Ghent University,
Gent, Belgium; dDepartment of Computer Science, KU Leuven, Heverlee, Belgium
ABSTRACT
The increasing popularity of social networking sites has been a source of many privacy concerns. To
mitigate these concerns and empower users, different forms of educational and technological
solutions have been developed. Developing and evaluating such solutions, however, cannot be
considered a neutral process. Instead, it is socially bound and interwoven with norms and values
of the researchers. In this contribution, we aim to make the research process and development of
privacy solutions more transparent by highlighting questions that should be considered. (1) Which
actors are involved in formulating the privacy problem? (2) Is privacy perceived as a human right
or as a property right on one’s data? (3) Is informing users of privacy dangers always a good
thing? (4) Do we want to influence users’ attitudes and behaviours? (5) Who is the target
audience? We argue that these questions can help researchers to better comprehend their own
perspective on privacy, that of others, and the influence of the solutions they are developing. In
the discussion, we propose a procedure called ‘tool clinics’ for further practical implementations.
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1. Introduction
Social networking sites (SNSs) have not only become a
part of the everyday acting repertoire for many, but
they also challenge the management of personal infor-
mation flows and the notion of privacy (Xu 2012). The
difficulties of these processes have spurred a large body
of research on the many faces of privacy, coming from
a wide range of scientific, political, economic, and
other perspectives. Such work, however, cannot tread a
linear way to the one truth and the one solution to all
problems. On the contrary, the more these perspectives
meet and interact with one another, the clearer one all-
too-often-forgotten truth about research shows itself:
no researcher is just a neutral collector of facts; the criti-
cal questioning of one’s own approach is often crucial for
progress. With this approach, we aim to contribute to
making privacy research more effective – because only
through being transparent and self-reflective about our
own practices can we help bring privacy into being.
In the course of working together in a large interdisci-
plinary project,1 we repeatedly observed misunderstand-
ings and confusions both in our own collaboration and
in the literature. We compiled the most frequent sources
of these misunderstandings and confusions and distilled
them into the five self-reflective questions. These ques-
tions are used to structure, describe, and discuss the
assumptions and implications behind the decisions
made in the research process. This approach is not the
only way in which this could be done, and we neither
can nor intend to tackle all issues. To be precise, much
research has been devoted to developing privacy solutions
and/or designing technologies while taking into account
users’ privacy (i.e. privacy by design). In this paper, our
goal is to zoom out and make the relation between the
researcher and the technology under development (priv-
acy solutions) more transparent.
The paper is organised as follows. First, we frame our
approach and provide an overview of the self-reflective
questions. Second, we discuss how privacy problems
are defined, investigate which actors are involved in
this phase of definition, and ask whether privacy is per-
ceived as a human right or as a property right on one’s
data. Third, we focus on the solution for a problem
defined earlier and discuss the issues related to increas-
ing awareness and changing attitudes and behaviours.
Finally, in the discussion, we propose a procedure called
tool clinics for further practical implementations of the
proposed approach.
2. Five self-reflective questions
When developing technologies, researchers always have
a certain set of ideas, norms, and values that they put
into their technologies (Williams and Edge 1996;
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Hackett et al. 2008; Gillespie, Boczkowski, and Foot
2014). Moreover, the role of a researcher has extended
from a ‘neutral’ collector of facts with a focus on scienti-
fic progress to a socialisation agent with a society-
oriented goal. Increasing digital skills, facilitating control
over personal information, and raising awareness about
privacy threats are but some of the goals privacy
researchers could hope to attain in addition to gathering
and analysing data. Because of the non-neutral role of
researchers and their non-neutral solutions, we consider
it important to make the decisions made in the research
process transparent. Five questions will be discussed in
the following sections to help reach that goal.
We structured the paper in a way similar to the stages
in which a solution for a privacy problem typically pro-
ceeds: defining the problem and developing a solution. It
appears self-evident to first define a problem and then
solve it. But in the definition of a research problem,
researchers are strongly influenced by their own goals,
values, and pre-conceptions, and any solution they
choose will also be influenced by the properties of the
‘solution technology’, be that a certain type of discourse,
a software tool, or the context defined by the institutional
setting and the people in it. So in the Latourian sense, the
first phase (problem definition) will be strongly influ-
enced by the ‘human’ in the ‘human-apparatus’ system,
and the second phase (problem solution), by the ‘appar-
atus’.2 We argue that it is necessary to make these design
choices more transparent, and we will provide five self-
reflective questions as leads into making the problem
definition phase (Qs 1 and 2) and, respectively, the pro-
blem solution phase (Qs 3–5) more transparent.
2.1. Q1. Which actors are involved in formulating
the privacy problem?
The way the privacy problem is defined depends on the
actors and stakeholders that are involved. The first self-
reflective question has two aspects: (a) ‘what relation-
ships does it concern?’ (i.e. relationships towards other
people or towards institutions) and (b) ‘which actors
define the privacy problem?’ (i.e. security experts or
users).
SNS users disclose information to multiple actors.
This has implications for the definition of the privacy
problem. Raynes-Goldie (2010) differentiates between
institutional privacy, that is, privacy vis-à-vis third par-
ties like commercial institutions, governments, and the
like, and social privacy, that is, privacy vis-à-vis other
people like family, friends, and acquaintances. Social
privacy problems tend to be more visible than insti-
tutional privacy problems and originate from everyday
social interaction between SNS users, such as
embarrassing footage being (re-)shared by Facebook
friends. Here, privacy is a means for achieving something
else, like self-realisation, intimacy, or solitude (Westin
1967). The problems here are mostly contextual by
nature. In the current digital and networked society,
temporal, spatial, and social boundaries are becoming
more fluid (Bauman and Lyon 2013), which creates
dynamics such as a merging between the public and pri-
vate sphere, context collapse, and invisible audiences
(boyd 2008a). Institutional privacy problems concern
the watching, gathering, processing, and using of per-
sonal information by third parties. Users are often not
aware of these background processes related to their per-
sonal data (Acquisti and Gross 2006), which can explain
why they often do not express any concerns with regard
to this matter.
The definition process also depends on who defines
the privacy problem. Gürses and Diaz (2013) identified
two large groups of viewpoints in the privacy literature.
They characterise one of them as expressing a notion
of privacy largely defined by ‘security experts’: scientists
or developers of privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs),
mostly from a security-and-privacy background. PET
developers tend to focus on the data processing and
use. Martin, Rise and Martin (2015) showed how IT pro-
fessionals are particularly sensitive to securing data from
unknown third parties. Some of them extend this by
questioning the ongoing commodification of personal
information and surveillance (e.g. Gandy 2003; Coté
and Pybus 2007; Fuchs 2012). The other group is charac-
terised as expressing a notion of privacy based on user
perceptions. This relates to the concerns that user’s
express and to the harms that they experience when tech-
nologically mediated communications disrupt social
boundaries. In terms of the distinction made by Gürses
and Diaz (2013), the ‘security experts’ focus mostly on
institutional privacy, while the ‘users’ tend to focus on
social privacy.3
We argue that a researcher should question which
actors are involved when defining the privacy problem.
Both social and institutional privacy problems concern
the disclosed information in SNSs, but they typically
involve different actors and require different solutions.
Moreover, they face different challenges, as indicated
below.
Social privacy problems are strongly connected to the
everyday practices of users. Practices that were once
thought to be privacy violations can become normal
and thus taken for granted. The emergence and accep-
tance of the Newsfeed can serve as an example. In Sep-
tember 2006, Facebook introduced the Newsfeed, a
constantly updating start page that displays the actions
of users performed on Facebook for a wider audience,
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that is, pages they like, conversations they have with
others, comments, or music preferences. Although
CEO Mark Zuckerberg stated that no privacy was vio-
lated, boyd (2008b, 18) argued that the sense of control
over information was harmed because information was
reused in a way that users had not foreseen. Initially,
many users protested against this feature (boyd 2008b).
Nowadays, for most the Newsfeed does not appear to
be a privacy violation, but a central part of the SNS
experience. Since social privacy problems are closely
connected to everyday practices, these practices can
limit our view on privacy and its (changing) meaning.
This could even lead to an unquestioning acceptance of
the privacy policy of service providers.
Institutional privacy problems focus on the gathering
and collecting of the digital footprints that users leave
behind. When a solution is proposed – for example, to
encrypt the traffic between users and service providers
– it might well be that the postulated ‘problem’ is not
perceived as such by users. However, that something is
perceived as a problem by users is a pivotal factor for a
subsequent solution to be adopted and appropriated.
2.2. Q2. Is privacy perceived as a human right or
as a property right on one’s data?
The discussion in the previous section has already given
a glimpse on the fact that even among experts privacy
remains a contested term. There is a general agreement
that privacy is inherently relational, where the type of
‘other’ in the relationship can be one basis for classifi-
cations (e.g. into social and institutional privacy, as
explained above). But beyond that, the term has very
different interpretations, which may or may not be
mutually exclusive. We will highlight important
interpretations by structuring key notions of privacy
along three dimensions, and then argue why we believe
the researcher’s stance on what the right to privacy is
to be a better candidate for a self-reflective question
than his or her position in this multidimensional land-
scape of what privacy is.
One important distinction is that between privacy as
intimacy and ‘the right to be let alone’ (e.g. Warren,
Samuel and Brandeis 1890) and privacy as autonomy,
including informational self-determination and its con-
trol of data about the self (e.g. Westin 1967). Another
popular definition underlines the important role of a
protected sphere as a space for autonomy, and it shifts
the focus from control to self-realisation: ‘the absence
of unreasonable constraints on the construction on
one’s identity’ (Agre & Rothenberg 2001). In emphasis-
ing the role of privacy for other goals rather than for
its own sake, this definition is also related to the notion
of the ‘instrumental’ role of privacy for other goals such
as freedom of speech and democracy (e.g. Rouvroy and
Poullet 2009). These two notions of instrumentality dif-
fer along another dimension, that of individual vs. collec-
tive. For example, social psychologists Altman (1976)
and Petronio (2002) have focused more strongly on the
individual level, when compared with scholars such as
Nissenbaum (2004), who in her proposal of ‘contextual
integrity’ has focused on the social norms governing
what actors and what (re-)contextualisations are deemed
appropriate.
Opinions also differ along a third dimension: whether
privacy can be regarded as an invariant human need and
behaviour that can be observed across times and cultures
(e.g. Altman 1976), or a relatively recent concern
brought about by the emergence of modern media. The
latter is sometimes suggested with reference to Warren
and Brandeis’ (1890) seminal discussion of the modern
legal notion of the right to privacy, which derived from
a court case involving the then newmedium of photogra-
phy – see however Greenwald (2014) who identifies priv-
acy legislation ideas in the Code of Hammurabi, which
can be argued to support the ‘invariant’ view.
In the current paper, we are not trying to contribute to
this discussion, and we believe it is a matter of standard
scientific practice for researchers to know and state their
definition(s) of what privacy is. We believe, however,
that – based on their descriptive definition(s), but
in no way following from them in a straightforward
way – researchers also bring normative notions to bear:
what privacy should be. Obviously, this stance has a
large impact on the solutions researchers will propose
(Qs 3–5). However, we observe that researchers are
often much more implicit regarding this normative
choice than regarding the descriptive one. And because
this aspect is important but often remains in the back-
ground, we consider the question to be an important rec-
ommendation for our list of self-reflective questions.
So what exactly does it mean to have privacy rights?
We want to summarise – in a necessarily simplified
way – the current discussion in terms of a spectrum
between two perspectives. These can best be described
by the rallying cries ‘my data belong to me, and I can
use it for whatever purpose’ vs. ‘privacy is a human
right, and its protection is in the public interest’.
Both perspectives talk about (among other things) a
subjective right: an entitlement that a person has, and
neither presupposes any obligation (so neither says
that people are forced to opt for privacy). However,
they differ in many aspects. The perspectives are loosely
aligned with different legal regimes: property rights on
personal data vs. privacy (and data protection) as a fun-
damental right, that is, as a human right guaranteed by a
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constitution (similar to, e.g., the freedom of speech). The
perspectives are also aligned with different economic/
political regimes: economic liberalism with its focus on
individual freedoms and markets vs. social liberalism
with its (added) focus on differences between people
regarding power, wealth, education, and other factors
(and the need to address these in the interest of social
justice); interdependencies between individual decisions;
and the resulting market failures and needs for regu-
lations. Due to the proliferation of legal and economic
variants that are being proposed, we will refrain from
an in-depth legal or economic analysis and instead
group them into two (necessarily idealised) perspectives,
call these the data as individual property (DIP) perspec-
tive and privacy as a human right (PHR) perspective, and
explain the perspectives by the positions they take on a
number of key issues.
We argue that an answer for each of these issues or
sub-questions can help in making one’s perspective on
privacy transparent.
1. Who gets to decide what happens with personal data?
This question is often framed as one of ‘individual
choice vs. collective regulation’. DIP proponents
argue that individuals know best what is good for
them, differ in their preferences (including their
desired level of privacy), and should therefore decide.
They observe that ‘in existing system architectures,
users have little control over what information is
being shared [,] and [they] must trust the service pro-
viders to protect their highly individualised and sen-
sitive data’ (Mun et al. 2010). In other words, DIP
proponents perceive the current situation less as
one governed by data-protection regulation, and
more as essentially ungoverned. PHR proponents,
on the other hand, emphasise that individuals may
not always know what is in their best interest and
that property-rights regimes too need regulation.4
In addition, PHR proponents argue that social effects
(see 6. below) should limit individual choice.
2. Can individuals profit (financially) from ‘the data
industry’, for example by selling (access to or use
of) their personal data? DIP proponents point to
the huge gains made by data-processing companies;
if people were enabled to ‘own’ their data, then they
– the rightful owners – would be able to profit from
this (Samuelson 2000). PHR proponents prefer to
regard (personal and other) data as enablers of trans-
actions that should be advantageous for people (‘data-
processing systems are designed to serve man;
whereas they must, whatever the nationality or resi-
dence of natural persons, respect their fundamental
rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy,
and contribute to economic and social progress,
trade expansion and the well-being of individuals’,
EU 95/94/EC, Recital (2)).5
3. May the right to privacy be given away? To a DIP pro-
ponent, this is a logical next step to best enable indi-
viduals to exercise control over their data and profit
financially from tailor-made, individually negotiable
deals: not only should individuals be able to ‘sell
their data’, they should also be able to ‘sell these
data along with the rights on them’. Legally, this is
the alienability of property rights. In contrast,
human and fundamental rights are, by definition,
inalienable: they ‘belong’ to a person anyway, they
are constitutive of personhood, and they can thus
not be given away or waived (Purtova 2010).
4. Can and should a (full-fledged) market in personal
data exist? A DIP proponent would consider the
steps of commodification (making data and the rights
on them saleable and commensurable) as necessary
on the route to efficient markets that make everyone
better off. PHR proponents would argue that com-
plete commodification is not possible anyway (see
point 3.) and point to the many hidden (and, they
argue, wrong) assumptions often made in arguments
for commodification (e.g. Lohmann 2013).
5. Who is responsible for the protection of people’s
privacy interests? If privacy is a fundamental right
(PHR), then the state is responsible for guaranteeing
it – not only by not interfering with individual free-
doms (negative right, ‘freedom from’), but also by
actively protecting them (positive right, ‘freedom
to’, and the state’s positive obligations). With DIP,
on the other hand, people would be individually
responsible for what they do with their data – thus,
for example, if someone decided to sell all rights to
his or her personal data, these rights would be
gone as in the sale of a material possession or an
intellectual product. The state would be responsible
for protecting the property rights of the old as well
as of the new owners.
6. What are the underlying assumptions about individ-
uals and collectives? The DIP perspective focuses on
individuals, in line with the general belief of economic
liberalism that individual choice on markets will lead
to the best global outcome. The PHR perspective
more strongly perceives the challenges posed by econ-
omic and social inequalities and the questions of
social solidarity as necessary starting points for politi-
cal, economic, and legal designs. Related to this are
beliefs about interdependencies. While DIP advocates
tend to regard privacy as an individual question, PHR
advocates emphasise the role of privacy for the public
interest. In other words, one person’s lack of privacy
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may have unfavourable effects on everybody’s funda-
mental rights and, therefore, on the very fabric of
society.
Compromises between these two extremes are poss-
ible. As an example of a possible ‘compromise’ between
the two idealised extremes of DIP and PHR, we briefly
sketch some key elements of the European Union’s
legal treatment of privacy and data protection. On the
one hand, the EU has made a firm commitment to priv-
acy and data protection as fundamental human rights
through the European Convention on Human Rights
and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights
(Articles 7 and 8) and a number of landmark judgements
on these in courts (Purtova 2010; De Hert 2012). On the
other hand, the basic template for data-protection law,
the EU Privacy Directive EU 95/94/EC, explicitly set
out to respect both (a) the interests and choices of citi-
zens (see Recital (2) cited under point 2. above) and
their fundamental rights and (b) the interests of com-
merce (for further details and arguments, see, for
example, De Hert 2012 or Purtova 2010).
We believe that although some authors explicitly call
for property rights on personal data (which, to the best of
our knowledge, do not exist in any jurisdiction at the
moment) and others explicitly investigate human rights
issues, most researchers deal with different or more
specific issues. Still, we argue that many specific issues
would profit from a self-reflection on what assumptions
lie behind them and what positions, economic interests,
and political agendas may be furthered by them.
2.3. Q3. Is informing users of privacy dangers
always a good thing?
Writing oneself into being online requires constant
reflection (boyd 2008b; Markham 2013). The latter has
been labelled with the term ekstasis (Waskul 2005).
Markham (2013, 284) points out ‘how everyday activities
in digital media contexts require conscious deliberation,
technical skills, and more reflexivity about activities or
rules that are in constant play in the construction of
self and society’. An essential part of such ekstasis is
knowledge of the social situation. People, however, are
often unaware of their online audience and/or its size
(Bernstein et al. 2013; Litt 2013), or they do not differen-
tiate between intended and unintended audiences among
their online friends. Stutzman, Gross, and Acquisti
(2013) point out that ‘silent listeners’, such as service
providers and third-party applications, are often not
even considered as an audience in the first place.
It would seem justifiable to make SNS users aware of
their environment and outline both social and
institutional privacy issues, so as to enable them to
obtain a state of ekstasis. However, informing users or
provoking awareness, we will argue, may also have nega-
tive consequences, is not always possible, and is biased by
the view of the initiator.
1. Is awareness a value in itself? When growing up, we
internalise the norms, values, and structure of the com-
munity and society we live in. They shape who we are
and how we act in everyday life, a process that seems
self-evident. New technologies and their related norms
are also part of this environment and get domesticated
and appropriated. When informing users of the dangers
of SNSs and their consequences for the self, we also, to a
certain extent, self-alienate them, that is, make them look
at their own practices in relation to the environment.
Internalising such an idea leads to a questioning of
one’s own behaviour and makes people think about
their own actions, rather than act in the first place,
which does not always contribute to a more enjoyable
or easier life. Moreover, and in particular for SNSs, it
may harm the positive reasons why users are on SNSs
in the first place, such as developing identities, establish-
ing bridging and social capital, and seeking information.
The assumption that having more knowledge is
always better in all respects is thus not necessarily true.
A researcher or designer who wants to inform users
will have to trade off the risks of self-alienation or social
displeasure against the risks that he or she wants to pro-
tect users from. In societies, we make these tradeoffs
every day, assessing risks including ‘that one wrong
choice with irreversible consequences’ differently, result-
ing in different urgencies with which we enforce self-
alienation (or tolerate risk-taking), for example when it
comes to alcohol, marijuana, heroin, drunk driving, or
unprotected sexual intercourse. The assessment of
these risks and the conclusions drawn for enforcement
or tolerance are never just objective, statistical acts, but
regularly involve a normative component.
Given the complexity of the architecture of SNSs and
users’ lack of knowledge about information processing
by service providers, one could argue that it is necessary
to make users aware of what is going on, so that they can
make informed decisions. Users’ capabilities, however,
have been questioned from many angles. Acquisti and
Gross (2006) indicate that bounded rationality affects
the decisions users make, so that they do not always
make decisions in their best interest, whatever that may
be. Many experiments have demonstrated how users
do not always act in line with their preferences and
thus may make decisions that, even if they are informed
decisions, do them more harm than good (Berendt,
Günther, and Spiekermann 2005; Brandimarte, Acquisti,
and Loewenstein 2012; Knijnenburg, Kobsa, and Jin
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2013). If users still make the wrong choices when they are
informed of potential privacy problems, when provided
with the necessary tools to solve that specific problem,
we should ask ourselves if awareness is always a value
in itself.6
Making users aware of the dangers of SNSs presup-
poses that we canmake users aware. In our second argu-
ment, we will illustrate how this is not always possible.
2. Is awareness possible? In premodern society, when
was almost always inextricably connected with where.
According to Giddens (1991), modern society is con-
fronted with a ‘time-space distanciation’. The latter, he
argues, is a primary condition for the process of disem-
bedding, which can be defined as dividing social relations
from the local context in which they are embedded. As a
result, we increasingly trust systems that we do not grasp
completely. Following the conceptualisation of Giddens
(1991), SNSs can be considered as such a system: it is
complex to grasp the computational workings of SNSs
and their effects on people’s lives. Privacy is a multifa-
ceted concept with many layers, consisting of inter-
twined notions that influence one another (Solove
2006). Privacy in a networked world is even more com-
plex, as our discussion of the first lead question has
shown. Giddens (1991) proposes to ‘ride the juggernaut’,
that is, modernity, which is difficult because faceless
commitment in abstract systems (e.g. trust in SNSs) is
sustained by facework relations and re-embedded (e.g.
friends explaining how to employ privacy settings), and
internalising norms, values, and structures can make us
unaware or, on the other side of the continuum, lead
to self-alienation.
This brings us to our third argument: awareness does
not automatically imply a questioning of communication
technologies. We will illustrate how the views of users,
non-users, and also researchers are naturally biased.
3. Is awareness neutral? Papacharissi (2012, 195)
emphasises that ‘historical context shapes how we inter-
pret technologies. It informs uses, expectations, and
rituals that are adjusted or re-invented’. It is unavoidable
that SNSs are compared with previous communication
technologies or previous experiences in general. Older
generations or non-users will, therefore, not always
understand why teenagers (or others) post information
towards multiple audiences at once, while users who
make use of SNSs on a daily basis will quickly appropri-
ate its norms, values, and structures into their everyday
practices. In other words, older generations or non-
users limit their view by a nostalgic comparison with
older technologies and experiences (‘I didn’t have a cell-
phone or Facebook to communicate with my friends,
and I turned out fine’). Younger generations or older
generations who make use of SNSs to extend their
dramaturgical experience and keep in touch with their
friends will be less critical of the technical properties of
SNSs by means of appropriation. The differences
between generations indicate how one’s perspective is
not neutral but situational. Similarly, raising awareness
depends on the perspective of those who want to raise
it, and who will justify their claims based on what they
think are justifiable arguments.
Researchers could rely on how users make use of priv-
acy settings provided by service providers to justify the
need for raising awareness. However, in such an
approach, the researcher does not question the privacy
policy of service providers. Hence, via the authors’
unstated assumptions, his or her views on privacy are
largely similar to those of service providers. The ways
we justify our goals can even be subtler. In a qualitative
study, Wang et al. (2011) researched regrets in Facebook,
with the aim of helping SNS users avoid such regrets.
This can be valuable for users’ reputation management
or maintaining relationships with others. At first sight,
it seems like a neutral and justifiable way of pushing
users towards a course of action, presumed advan-
tageous. After all, in this approach, the users themselves
define what is appropriate and what is not, rather than
the service providers. Nudging users based on what
they would regret, however, is a very individualistic
approach: are regrets and making mistakes not an essen-
tial part of human life?
As a consequence of these arguments about our third
question, we ask researchers to be critical towards
informing users. Rather than criticising transparency
or awareness, we aim to criticise not being transparent
about raising awareness. We argue that a researcher
should justify why, how, and to what extent users should
be made aware.
2.4. Q4. Do we want to influence users’ attitudes
and behaviours?
In addition to the question to what extent we want to
inform the user and raise awareness about privacy risks
in SNSs, the question should be asked whether the sol-
ution being developed aims at an attitudinal and/or
behavioural change. When considering this question,
one should keep in mind that developing solutions
always includes a researcher’s expectations of desirable
attitudes and behaviour. This is not always in line with
the goals and expectations of the user. It can be argued
that every individual has the right to not care, and to
choose to behave ‘unsafely’ if that is what he or she
wants (e.g. given the benefits this entails).
It is understandable that privacy researchers believe
they have the best interest of the user in mind when
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they state that users should care about their privacy and
behave as safely as possible. However, developing sol-
utions in an attempt to influence users’ attitudes and
behaviour raises important ethical questions about the
extent to which a researcher can impose his or her values
(Kimmel 1988). Kelman (2001) suggested that state-
ments such as ‘it’s for the users’ own good’ should be
regarded as a violation of the principle of freedom.
Indeed, forcing people to behave ‘safely’ in SNSs can
be judged as paternalistic and even undemocratic. There-
fore, it is important to keep in mind that influencing
behaviour, even under ideal conditions, is an ethically
ambiguous act (Kelman 1965).
If researchers decide to aim at attitudinal or behav-
ioural change, there are different levels at which they
could try to impose this change. Chen et al. (2008) right-
fully argued that a dilemma exists between enforcement
and protection of personal information. According to
Kelman, Warwick, and Bermant (1978), the goals of an
intervention range from coercion, via manipulation
and persuasion, to facilitation of a certain attitude or
behaviour. These different means of intervention are
extensively described by Kelman (2001). He states that
coercion implies that people are forced to take actions
that contradict their preferences. Examples of coercive
solutions are parents who forbid their children to use
SNSs, censorship of certain posts by SNS filters, or SNS
systems that do not allow minors to post publicly on
their SNS profile. Manipulation entails a change in the
structure of alternatives that users get, for example by
making certain privacy settings in SNSs the default.
This leaves the person free to make choices, but within
a deliberately modified structure. The next point on
the continuum that Kelman (2001) describes is persua-
sion, which is built on the strength of argumentation,
reasoning, and debate to influence people’s attitudes
and behaviour. Different privacy-awareness-raising cam-
paigns and privacy-enhancing awareness tools can be
categorised as a form of persuasion, as they try to explain
why you should not post certain information (rather
than just inform about the risks, e.g. pedagogy of regret,
see Brown 2012). Finally, Kelman (2001) defines facili-
tation as a technique that focuses on offering different
resources. With regard to privacy interventions,
examples are awareness-raising campaigns (making
information available) that do not try to convince people
to act a certain way, but that offer different tools and
strategies that can be used whenever users choose to
use them.
This continuum shows a gradual increase in the free-
dom that the person being influenced still has. Persua-
sion and facilitation are generally seen as consistent
with the principle of autonomy and freedom, and are
therefore ethically more acceptable than coercion and
manipulation. However, this does not mean that facili-
tation is always ethically justifiable, or that coercion is
never ethically justifiable (Kelman 2001). Indeed, facili-
tation by offering certain tools (and not others) might
already structure people’s choices and limit options. Fur-
thermore, offering options to certain groups, but not to
others, can be seen as a coercion of the others, as they
do not have the resources available. On the other hand,
coercion can be ethically justifiable, for instance when
public health or public security is seriously threatened.
Again, this can be seen in the light of the discussion
above, concerning whether privacy is regarded as a
human right (is a violation of privacy rights a serious
threat to public health or safety?) or as a property right.
We argue that it is necessary for a researcher to be
transparent about his or her values and norms when set-
ting the goals of any solution and when deciding on how
to reach these goals.
2.5. Q5. Who is the target audience?
The previous two questions about awareness, attitudes,
and behaviour also need to be considered in the light
of the target audience. While researchers sometimes
take into account their target audience when it comes
to problem analysis or design, they should also take
into account their target audience with regard to the ethi-
cal question of influencing awareness, attitudes, and
behaviour. The importance of this consideration
becomes apparent when vulnerable audiences, such as
minors, are concerned. Recent research shows that
SNSs are increasingly popular with teenagers, who are
sharing ever more personal information on these sites
(Madden et al. 2013). The privacy concerns that are
associated with this increase raise the question whether
we need to protect these users, especially since several
studies show that these teenagers might be particularly
vulnerable in terms of their online privacy (Walrave
and Heirman 2013).
To reach all minors, school education has been put
forth as a solution (Patchin and Hinduja 2010; Tejedor
and Pulido 2012; Vanderhoven, Schellens and Valcke
2014b) and a variety of educational tools has been devel-
oped to meet these concerns (e.g. Insafe 2012; Vanderho-
ven, Schellens and Valcke 2014a). However, for most of
these materials, it is not clear whether they only aim to
raise awareness, to enhance skills, or whether they aim
to change attitudes and behaviour as well.
Although there might be ethical objections to influen-
cing teenagers’ attitudes and behaviours (e.g. the hier-
archical relationship that arises when trying to
influence minors), there are other important
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considerations to take into account, such as developmen-
tal skills. Can we expect that a teenager is able to make
good decisions when disclosing information in SNSs? It
has been found that young users are more impatient,
and are less likely to recognise the risks and future con-
sequences of their decisions (Cauffman and Steinberg
2000). The technical properties of SNSs (e.g. scalability,
see boyd 2008a) make it difficult for users to revise
their decisions and increase the impact of certain
decisions. Hence, when a teenager for example shares a
photograph on a SNS in which he/she is drinking alco-
hol, he/she might have the beneficial short-term conse-
quences in mind: it might be considered cool by his or
her peers and it might shape this teenager’s identity in
a way that he/she perceives as beneficial. However, it
can be harder for this teenager to recognise the possible
future consequences of posting this picture, for example
on future job applications. Since it was also found that
teenagers have a harder time controlling their impulses
and have higher thrill-seeking and disinhibition scores
than adults (Cauffman and Steinberg 2000), this example
might not be a rare case. The personality of minors may
simply not be evolved enough to make good and
informed decisions.
We believe that it is important for researchers to
deliberately consider the characteristics of the group of
people they research and for whom they develop and
propose artefacts, tools, and interventions.
3. Discussion
3.1. Summary and reflections
Researchers and their solutions for privacy problems in
SNSs are not neutral: ideas, norms, and values of the
researchers are translated into problem definition as
well as solution, and the developed solution delegates
instructions on how to act (Latour 1992). In this paper,
we argue for making the privacy research process more
transparent by asking self-reflective questions through-
out the process.
We first argued that a researcher should take into
account which actors are involved when defining the
privacy problem. The first question has two sub-ques-
tions: (a) is the privacy problem defined by security
experts or users and (b) does it concern relationships
towards other people or towards institutions? This first
question is necessary because the vocabulary, solutions,
and challenges are different. The second question con-
cerned the definition of privacy as a human right or as
a property right on one’s data. We consider it necessary
for researchers to ‘take a stance’ and question and formu-
late their perspective on this continuum. If not, solutions
are justified via the researchers’ unstated assumptions,
and social, economical, and political agendas remain hid-
den. The third and fourth questions centred on the
desired impact of the solution (i.e. increasing awareness,
and changing attitudes and behaviours). Although rais-
ing awareness might seem self-evident, it can also have
negative outcomes, is not always possible, and is never
neutral. Influencing attitudes and behavioural change is
even more problematic because in addition to imposing
one’s own notion of privacy, it also pushes users into a
certain direction that is perceived as desirable. It is there-
fore necessary that a researcher justifies why, how, and to
what extent he or she wants to influence the user. Finally,
we argued that a researcher should take into account the
target audience when developing solutions, because cer-
tain audiences, such as minors, are more vulnerable than
others.
Taken together, all of these questions make the
research process more transparent, including the role
of the researcher and the ethical and moral dimension
of the solution being built. It should be noted, however,
that our approach also has limitations. First, in this
article, we have discussed the ethical dimension from a
general perspective. Further work could elaborate how
different philosophical orientations towards ethics relate
to transparency and self-reflection, like virtue ethics
(Verbeek 2011; Brey, Briggle, and Spence 2012). Second,
we should not forget that transparency and self-reflec-
tion are not ends in themselves, and that while they
may be necessary for making progress towards our
‘real’ goal of improving privacy, they may not be suffi-
cient. To make progress, we need practical procedures
for engendering self-reflection, we need practical pro-
cedures for then transforming it into manifest changes
to help privacy, and we need evaluation methods to
test whether we have reached our goals. In the next
and final subsection of this paper, we will sketch such
practical procedures for transformation. For now, we
rely on the evaluation methods that have been proposed
for privacy-enhancing technologies – noting that these
evaluation methods will be a next frontier to be targeted
in future work.
3.2. Practical implications
How can a researcher or someone interested in subject-
ing their work to these self-reflective questions proceed?
We hope that a cognitive awareness of the issues raised
can be a first step in this process. However, we also
believe that it is better to draw on multiple perspectives
(when the non-uniqueness of perspectives is the central
issue), and better still to complement cognition by
action. We therefore believe that procedures that aim
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at overcoming an overly strong focus on a single ‘sol-
ution’ by eliciting different viewpoints can be helpful.
In Morton et al. (2013), we have proposed the idea of
tool clinics as a format for doing this. We believe that
the lead questions identified in the present paper and
their discussion can help structure such a tool clinic. In
order to explain how, we will first give some background
on the general concept.
Tool clinics aim at encouraging a collaborative (re-)
consideration of a technological solution, research tech-
nique, or other artefact, in order to critically assess its
design, development, and deployment from multiple
perspectives. Another objective is to turn such solutions
or artefacts into a tool for exploring the problem space.
Finally, a tool clinic can be used to provide those who
are developing the solutions with a setting to rethink
the framing and presentation of their solutions.
A tool clinic provides a framework and approach for
multiple-perspective formative exploration and review of
a technological solution, research technique, or other
artefact under development. The objective is to reflect
from different perspectives on practices around the
development, encoding, use, domestication, decoding,
and sustainability of a tool to gain quasi-ecological vali-
dation. Practically, we think of a tool clinic in terms of a
structured meeting or a series of meetings (not necess-
arily face-to-face) between an appropriately composed
group of researchers and practitioners with different dis-
ciplinary, stakeholder-related, etc., backgrounds.
The idea of a tool clinic is related to a range of formats
from education, the military, software development, and
science and technology studies (see Morton et al. 2013
for more details and references). Inspired by this work,
we preview a typical tool clinic to consist of three steps:
1. Identifying particular affordances of the technological
solution, research technique, or other artefact and
possible (unintended) consequences for people and
society;
2. Gathering perspectives and practices of different
experts, disciplines, and/or stakeholders (users, pol-
icy-makers, industry, etc.) linked with the develop-
ment, deployment, and sustainable evolution of a
particular tool, solution, technique, or artefact;
3. Informing and advising on the technological design
of the tool or solution, in order to avoid negative con-
sequences and to further positive outcomes.
The self-reflective questions described and discussed
in the present paper can serve as an essential backdrop
for identifying one’s own perspective and the affordances
of one’s artefact in step 1, as well as for the selection of
experts in step 2 (and in turn the elicitation of their
perspectives). Of course, tool clinics are not exempt
from the processes that we have discussed in this
paper. For example, they may themselves create new
and narrowing research norms (which should be
reflected upon). Still, a structure such as a tool clinic
could do a lot to help researchers over the threshold
towards explicit reflection and deliberation, processes
that often get lost in the time pressures of standard
research practices and informal feedback cultures.
Notes
1. The name of the project is omitted for the purpose of
double-blind reviewing.
2. Latour (1992) proposed to conceive technologies as
humans with whom we interact and shape our everyday
actions. When designers develop technologies, they del-
egate certain tasks that were previously assigned to
humans or other technologies. In turn, these technol-
ogies impose certain behaviours on humans, and they
delegate prescription, that is, instructions on how to
act, and thereby the moral and ethical dimension of
technologies.
3. It should be noted that security experts, of course, can
also be users and express social privacy-related pro-
blems. Users may also express their concern towards
information gathering and processing. Moreover,
both institutional and social privacy are strongly
intertwined. For example, third parties need to
adopt users’ information in a manner that is consist-
ent with the privacy policy and users’ privacy prefer-
ences. To unravel the complexity of online privacy,
however, we find it is necessary to reduce complexity
and differentiate between the actors and relationships
involved.
4. Samuelson (2000) gives a good summarization of these
positions and outlines some problems with them.
5. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data. http://
eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
31995L0046:en:HTML
6. Foucault ([1976] 1979), for example, questioned self-
alienation when arguing that the age of reason forces
people to be reflective all of the time. Internalizing
such an idea leads to a constant questioning of one’s
own behaviour and makes people think about their
own actions, rather than act in the first place.
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